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CRImI-

INOLOGY.-The American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology is an outgrowth of the National Conference on Criminal Law and Criminology held in Chicago in June, 1909. The idea
of a conference representing the various classes interested in the
problems connected with the administration of punitive justice,
including the treatment of criminals, was a happy conception of
the law faculty of Northwestern University, and the holding
of such a conference was adopted as an appropriate way of
celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the foundation of the law
school of that institution. It was indeed a unique and fitting
method of commemorating an anniversary of this kind, coming
as it did at, a time when there is an awakening of interest in legal
reform and a crying need for co-operative effort among lawyers
and scientists. The conference was composed of about one hundred and fifty delegates representing the various professions and
occupations concerned directly or indirectly with the administration of the criminal law and the punishment of criminals, and included members of the bench and bar, professors of law in the
universities, alienists, criminologists, penologists, superintendents
of penal and reformatory institutions, psychologists, police
officials, probation officers, and the like. Delegates attended from
every section of the country and the conference was a very repre-
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sentative gathering of those -either actually concerned with the
administration of the criminal law or interested in its problems as
students and scientists. In character and purpose the conference
was entirely without precedent in the history of the United States.
It represented the first instance of co-operative effort among
those interested in a better system of criminal justice, and marks,
we venture to assert, the beginning of a new era in the history
of American criminal jurisprudence.
The conference afforded
an excellent opportunity for the exchange of ideas among lay
scientists and lawyers, and a sincere effort was made to reach
a common understanding on certain points concerning which
there has been a variance of opinion. Although the idea of such
a gathering was new to America it is an old one in Europe,
where congresses of criminologists have frequently been held for
the promotion of criminological science and the consideration of
practical problems connected with the administration of criminal
justice. In Europe the value of co-operation among lawyers
and scientists in promoting improvement in the criminal law and
in methods of criminal procedure has long been recognized.
An elaborate program covering almost every problem of
criminal science was prepared for the Chicago conference mainly
from the list of topics suggested by the delegates, and altogether
it constituted a remarkable program of constructive effort looking toward judicial and penal reform. For the systematization
and dispatch of the work of the congress the delegates were
divided into three sections, to the first of which were referred all
topics relating to the treatment (penal and remedial) of criminals; to the second, those relating to the organization, appointment and training of officials concerned with the administration
of punitive justice, and to the third, those having to do with
criminal law and procedure. To the conference as thus organized one hundred and thirty-five topics were submitted for consideration. They included such questions as the indeterminate
sentence, rehabilitation, procedure of juvenile courts, treatment
of accused persons under detention, indemnification for wrongful
detention, the employment of prisoners, bureaus of identification,
probation and parole, the insanity plea, public defenders, the
selection and treatment of jurors, means of increasing the effectiveness of the jury system, the unnecessary multiplication of
criminal laws, the examination of accused persons, the simplification of pleading, the need of efficient agencies for collecting and
publishing criminal and judicial statistics, restrictions on the right
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of appeal, reversals for technical errors, enlargement of the power
of the judge, the constitution and procedure of municipal courts,
laboratories for the scientific study of criminals, the individualization of punishment, the use of medical expert testimony, and
many others. Realizing the impossibility of dealing adequately
with such a variety of questions the conference wisely decided
to restrict its deliberations to the consideration of a small number
of topics which are to be made the subjects of investigation by
committees and upon which reports are to be presented at the
next conference. Among those topics were: (1) an effective system for recording the physical and moral, hereditary and environmental conditions of offenders; (2) the most effective methods of
probation and parole for adult offenders; (3) the indeterminate
sentence; (4) the organization and training of pardon and-parole
boards and the correlation of such boards with one another and
with the courts; (5) the practicability of establishing commissions
of specialists for giving expert testimony; (6) the possibility of
unifying state and local courts so as to diminish the cost of transcripts, bills of exception, writs of error, etc., in accordance with
the suggestion of the committee of fifteen of the American Bar
Association; (7) the simplification of pleading in criminal cases
and the elimination of technical errors. A committee was also
appointed to investigate and report on the methods of criminal
procedure in Europe and particularly in Great Britain, where the
administration of justice is frequently asserted to be a model of
efficiency and dispatch. Dean John D. Lawson of the University
of Missouri School of Law, and editor of the American Law
Review, and Professor Edwin R. I(eedy of Northwestern University Law School, as members of this committee, are now in
England studying British criminal procedure, this mission having
been undertaken with the approval and good wishes of President
Taft, who is a great admirer of the English system and deeply
interested in the outcome of the proposed inquiry. These gentlemen, it is understood will be joined by other members of the committee at an early date and the result of their investigations will be
awaited with interest by all those who desire impartial and firsthand information regarding the methods by which the administration of criminal justice in England has been brought to such a
high degree of efficiency.
An encouraging feature of the Chicago conference was the
practical unanimity among the lawyers and laymen alike that
certain of our rules of criminal procedure and penal methods are
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antiquated, inadequate and unworthy of the high standard of
civilization that we have attained in other respects and should be
modified in the interest of justice and social security.
The conference adopted resolutions calling attention to the
popular dissatisfaction with the results of our present methods
of administering criminal justice; declared that reliable and accurate information regarding the active administration of the criminal law was necessary to efficient legislation and administration;
appealed to Congress to provide through the agency of the Census
Bureau for the collection of full and accurate criminal and judicial
statistics covering the entire country; and urged the enactment of
legislation by the states, requiring prosecuting attorneys and
magistrates to report to some state officer full information regarding crime committed within their jurisdictions and the punishment
of offenders. Recognizing the desirability of making readily
accessible in English the more important treatises on criminology
published in foreign languages, steps were taken looking toward
the translation and publication of such treatises, to the end that
the principles of criminal science may be more generally studied
and the criminal law improved.
Finally, impressed with the
advantages of uniting the efforts of lawyers, criminologists,
sociologists and all others in the cause of a better criminal law,
the conference resolved to effect a permanent national organization, to be known as the American Institute of Criminal
Law and Criminology, whose purposes shall be to advance the
scientific study of crime, criminal law and procedure, to formulate and promote measures for solving the problems connected therewith, and to co-ordinate the efforts of individuals and
of organizations interested in the administration of certain and
speedy justice. Mr. John H. Wigmore of Chicago was elected
president of the new organization and it was decided to hold the
next meeting at Washington in October, 1910, in connection with
the International Prison Association. The proceedings of the Chicago conference will be published for distribution among the
members.
J. W. G.
PLAN OF THE JouR-AL.-During the sessions of the National Conference on Criminal Law and Criminology at Chicago
the fact was brought out that there is no journal or bulletin
published in the English language devoted wholly or in -part to
the cause of criminal law and criminology or to the problems
connected therewith, although there are thirty or forty periodicals
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of. this character published in foreign countries, notably Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Spain, Switzerland, and even India and South America.1 In Germany alone there are not less than twenty journals, bulletins or
periodical publications devoted wholly or in part to some phase of
criminal jurisprudence, criminology, penology, criminal psychology, psychiatry, or police administration. In France there are at
least seven such periodicals, and in Belgium there is one (the
Revue de droit penal et de criminologie), founded in 1907. In
Italy, where the interest in criminal science has long been active
and constructive, there are at least a dozen periodical publications
devoted to the problems of criminal law, criminology, penology and
the allied sciences.
America needs a journal which shall represent all classes of
persons whose professional activities or private interests bring
them into relation with the administration of the criminal law and
who are seeking for modern solutions of some of its most important
problems. Very recently there has been a remarkable awakening
of interest in the scientific study of crime and penal methodsan interest which is beginning to manifest itself in a productive
research and investigation as well as in destructive criticism of
antiquated methods and in constructiye proposals of reform. Believing that an organ should be provided for promoting this.
new spirit of research and investigation, the American Institute
of Criminal Law and Criminology has undertaken the establishment of this JouNAL.
It will aim to arouse and extend a wider interest in the
study of all questions relating to the administration of the crinanal law, including the causes and prevention of crime, methods of
criminal procedure and the treatment of criminals; to provide a
common medium for recording the results of the best scientific

thought and professional practice in this and foreign countries
concerning the larger problems of criminal science; to consider
the present state of the criminal law in every branch, and to bring
to the attention of all who are interested the evidences of progress
in legislation and administration so far as it relates to the detection and punishment of crime, criminal procedure, and the
punishment of offenders. It will advocate the introduction of
such reforms in existing penal methods as experience and reason

'A list of these periodicals is published in this issue of the journal on
pp. 163-166.
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have shown to be desirable, to the end that a more effective,
speedy and inexpensive system of criminal justice may be secured,
more modern and effective methods of dealing with criminals may
be introduced, and the causes of the present widespread and increasing popular dissatisfaction with the administration of the
criminal law may be removed.

The JOURNAL will encourage and

advocate legislation looking toward the collection and publication
of more systematic statistical and descriptive information relating
to the causes, nature and punishment of crime, including judicial
statistics showing the efficiency of those agencies and instrumentalities charged with the detection and punishment of crime.
Finally, the JOUiNxAL will furnish reviews of recent and current

scientific literature in English and foreign languages, dealing with
the progress of criminal jurisprudence and penal methods, together
with bibliographical and miscellaneous notes of interest to students
of the criminal law, criminology and the allied sciences.
It is believed that such a journal will appeal not only to
intelligent practitioners who are interested in the progress of a
scientific criminal law, but to all persons, public officials and
private individuals alike, who are concerned directly or inirectly
with the administration of punitive justice, as well as to a large
group of scholars who are working in the allied fields of sociology,
anthropology, psychology, philanthropy, etc. It is now recognized
that all these sciences are more or less closely related to criminal
jurisprudence and criminology and that they are capable of throwing a vast amount of much-needed light on many problems of the
criminal law. Each is in a sense contributory to the others and
at many points their spheres touch and even overlap.
J. W. G.
PROPOSED
REFORMIS
IN
FEDERAL
PROCEDURE.
Theodore
Roosevelt was the first president of the United States to
make the matter of the law's delay a subject of discussion in
his messages to Congress and to recommend legislation for
the improvement of federal procedure, with particular reference to the elimination of technicalities. In his message of December, 1906, he suggested the enactment of a law prohibiting
reversals and the granting of new trials on the ground of misdirection of the jury or the improper admission or rejection of
evidence, or for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure,
unless in the opinion of the court to which the application is
made, after an examination pf the entire case, it shall affirmatively
appear that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage
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of justice. In his message of December, 1907, he dwelt at some
length on the evils that have grown up in connection with the
administration of the criminal law, the most flagrant of which,
he said, were sentimentality and technicality. The remedy for the
latter, he went on to say, must come from the legislatures, the
courts and the lawyers, while the first must depend for its cure
upon the gradual growth of a sound public opinion which shall
insist that regard for the law and the demands of reason shall
control all other influences and emotions in the jury box. Both
of these evils, he declared with evident truth, must be removed or
public discontent with the criminal law will continue. In his
message of December, 1908, he again returned to the subject
saying,
"It is earnestly to be desired that some method should be devised for
doing away with the long delays which now obtain in the administration
of justice, and which operate with peculiar severity against persons of small
means and favor only the very criminals whom it is most desirable to
punish. These long delays in the final decisions of cases make in the aggregate a crying evil, and a remedy should be devised. Much of this intolerable
delay is due to improper regard paid to technicalities which are a mere
hindrance to justice. In some noted recent cases this over-regard for technicalities has resulted in a striking denial of justice, and flagrant wrong
to the body politic."

President Taft, who from his long experience at the bar and
on the bench may be presumed to speak with an authority, a
knowledge and a depth of conviction which Mr. Roosevelt did
not possess, has on a number of occasions recently asserted that
the administration of the criminal law in this country is a shame
and a reproach to our civilization and that in his judgment the
greatest question before the American people to-day is the improvement of our methods of procedure, to the end that a more
speedy, certain and inexpensive system of justice may be obtained.
In magazine articles and in public speeches Mr. Taft has again
and again dwelt upon this question with an earnestness which
comes from a deep sense of duty, pointing out in the most
convincing manner the sources of the evil and suggesting the
remedies that ought to be applied to meet the situation. Before
the Virginia Bar Association in August, 1908, and in a public
address at Chicago on September 16, 1909, he made this question
the principal theme of discussion. In the Chicago speech, in
particular, he called attention to the fact that the English procedure, .from which we derived our own, has been improved until
delays are now practically unknown. "In England," he said,
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"the judge controls the trial, controls the lawyers, keeps them
to relevant and proper argument, aids the jury in its consideration of the facts, not by direction but by suggestion, and the
lawyers are made to feel that they have an obligation not only
to their clients but also to the court and to the public at large,
not to abuse their office in such a way as to unduly lengthen the
trial and unduly to direct the attention of the court and the jury
away from the real facts at issue." "A murder case in England,"
he continued, "will be disposed of in a day or two days that here
will take three weeks or a month and no one can say, after an
examination of the record in England, that the rights of the defendant have not been preserved and that justice has not been
done." A trial in America, the President declared, is a game
in which the advantage is with the criminal, and, if he wins, he
seems to have the sympathy of a sporting public. Referring to
the expense of litigation on account of the employment of lawyers
and the payment of costs, a burden which in effect gives the wellto-do litigant an important advantage over the poor man, in
violation of the principle of equal justice, he said,
"What the poor man needs is a prompt decision of his case, and by
limiting the appeals in cases involving small amounts of money, so that
there shall be a final decision in the lower court, an opportunity is given
to the poor litigant to secure a judgment in time to enjoy it, and not after
he has exhausted all his resources in litigating to the Supreme Court.
"I am a lawyer and admire my profession, but I must admit that we
have had too many lawyers in legislating on legal procedure, and they have
been prone to think that litigants were made for the purpose of furnishing
business to courts and lawyers, and not courts and lawyers for the benefit
of the people and litigants."
We must, he said, make it so that the poor man will have as
nearly as possible an equal opportunity in litigating with the rich
man, but under present conditions, be it said to our shame, this is

not the case.

Concluding his Chicago speech the President ven-

tured the opinion that the time was now ripe for the appointment of a commission by Congress to take up the question of
the law's delays in the federal courts and to report a system
which should not only secure quick and cheap justice to litigants
in the federal courts, but which would offer a model to the legislators and courts of the states by the use of which they could
themselves institute reforms.
In his first annual message to Congress in December, 1909,
Mr. Taft gave an important place to a discussion of -the need of
reform in our court procedure, saying,
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"The deplorable delays in the administration of civil and criminal law
have received the attention of committees of the American Bar Association
and of many state bar associations, .as well as the considered thought of judges
and jurists. In my judgment, a change in judicial procedure, with a view
to reducing its expense to private litigants in civil cases and facilitating
the dispatch of business and final decision in both civil and criminal cases,
constitutes the greatest need in our American institutions. I do not doubt
for one moment that much of the lawless violence and cruelty exhibited in
lynchings is directly due to the uncertainties and injustice growing out of
the delays in trials, judgments and the executions thereof by our courts.
"Of course, these remarks apply quite as well to the adrinistration
of justice in state courts as to that in federal courts, and without making
invidious distinction, it is perhaps not too much to say that, speaking generally, the defects are less in the federal courts than in the state courts.
But they are very great in the federal courts. The expedition with which
business is disposed of both on the civil and criminal side of English courts
under modern rules of procedure makes the delays in our courts seem
archaic and barbarous. The procedure in the federal courts should furnish
an example for the state courts."
Referring to the impossibility, in the absence of a constitutional amendment of uniting under one form of action proceedings
at common law and equity, in the federal courts, he asserted that
it was, however, undoubtedly within the power of Congress to
simplify and make short and direct the procedure both at law
and equity in those courts. Carrying out the suggestion in his
Chicago speech in regard to the desirability of an inquiry into
the existing methods of procedure with a view to making improvements therein, the President recommended the appointment
of a commission with authority to examine the law and equity
procedure of the federal courts of first instance, the law of appeals from those courts to the courts. of appeals and to the
Supreme Court, and the costs imposed in such procedure upon
private litigants and upon the public treasury and make recommendations with a view to simplifying and expediting the procedure as far as possible and making it as inexpensive as may
be to the litigant of little means. A bill to carry out the latter
recommendation is now before the Judiciary Committee of the
House of Representatives. It was introduced by Mr. Madison and
empowers the President to appoint a commission of five lawyers,
of ample experience in the practice of their profession, to prepare and report to the next Congress, at its first regular session,
a complete code regulating the procedure in the courts of the
United States, and made as nearly uniform in all kinds of causes
as is practicable; designdd to expedite trials and decisions and
allowing reviews by appeal, without any unnecessary formality or
I0
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expense, and of such questions as are now reviewable by appeal,
writ of error, or certiorari. Another bill, introduced by Representative Parker, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, proposes
several modifications of federal procedure with a view to removing certain of the evils complained of by President Taft. This
bill was drawn by a committee of the American Bar Association
and was under consideration by the association for four years.
At the Seattle meeting in August, 1908, it was fully discussed
and was, with the exception of section 2, which was referred back
to the committee, almost unanimously approved by the Association. In this form it was discussed before the Judiciary Committee at the last Congress and was amended to meet the criticism
of certain members of the committee. As thus amended it was
reported back to the American Bar Association at its annual
meeting in Detroit in 1909 and was approved by the association
with but one dissenting vote.
The first section of the bill provides that
"no judgment should be set aside, or reversed, or new trial granted, by
any court of the United States in any case, civil or criminal, on the ground
of misdirection of the jury or the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless, in
the opinion of the court to which application is made, after an examination
of the entire cause it shall appear that the error complained of has resulted
in a miscarriage of justice."
This provision embodies the exact recommendation of President Roosevelt in his annual message of December, 1906, and is
substantially the suggestion made by Mr. Taft in an article
published in the Yale Law Journal before his election.1 Another
provision of the bill forbids the issue of writs of error in criminal
cases unless a justice of the Supreme Court shall certify that
there is probable cause for believing that the defendant was
unjustly convicted. The purpose of this provision is to prevent
an abuse of the right of appeal, which has often proved a disgrace to the administration of justice both in the federal and the
state courts. Under the present law the judge has no discretion
and is bound to allow an appeal as a matter of course. A criminal who has been convicted in a state court and has had his
conviction affirmed by the highest court of the state may sue out
a writ of error from the United States Supreme Court, alleging
that a federal question is involved. Although it may be clear
that no such question is involved and that the purpose is only to
1

Vol. XV, p. 1.
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cause delay the judge is, as has been said, bound to allow the
writ; the result being that justice is delayed and frequently
defeated. The proposed amendment makes it incumbent upon the
appellant or plaintiff in error to satisfy a justice of the Supreme
Court that he. has been unjustly convicted, otherwise the appeal
will not be allowed, the idea being that if he cannot convince one
of the justices of probable cause there is no reason to believe that
he could satisfy the whole court.
Another proposed amendment prohibits appeals to the Supreme Court in habeas corpus proceedings unless a justice of
that court shall certify that there is probable cause for believing
that the petitioner is unjustly 'deprived of his liberty. The evil
which it is aimed to eliminate by this amendment and the proposed
remedy are substantially the same as those of the preceding provision. In short, it is intended to prohibit the suing out of writs
of habeas corpus when one of the justices cannot be satisfied that
a federal question is involved and, like the preceding provision,
will remove a source of unnecessary delay and thus tend to secure
promptness and certainty of punishment where it is deserved. Still
another provision permits appeals and writs of error to be taken
from the District Courts to the Circuit Courts of Appeal in cases
of conviction of an infamous crime, instead of to the Supreme
Court, as is now allowed. If we understand the meaning of the
proposed amendment its effect will be to make the decision of
the Circuit Court of Appeals final in all criminal cases, even those
which are capital. Under the present practice writs of error in
capital cases may be taken to the Supreme Court and in nearly
every such case the privilege of finally resorting to this tribunal
is availed of, with the result that justice is not only delayed, but
the burden of being compelled to review nearly every capital case
in which there has been a conviction in a federal court interferes
with the discharge by the Supreme Court of its larger national
duties to the country as a whole.
The most important of the reforms proposed by the American Bar Association bill, however, is that which relates to reversals for technical errors. The principle of the proposed rule
is, of course, not new to Anglo-American procedure. It has in
fact been a rule of English procedure for more than a quarter
of a century and has given entire satisfaction in that country.
Mr. Everett P. Wheeler of the New York Bar, at a hearing given
by the House Judiciary Committee on January 12, last, speaking
of the effect of this rule in diminishing the number of reversals
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in England, testified that "the entire number of reversals in the
last two or three years in proportion to the number of appeals
has not exceeded 20 per cent. And where reversals occur final
judgment is usually entered. There is seldom occasion for a new
trial. In 1907 there were 197 reversals in the English Supreme
Court of Judicature. In only nine of these were new trials ordered. The theory of the whole system is that the trial in the
first instance shall settle the facts of the case; that you shall take
a verdict from the jury on every contested question of fact, and
have it understood by all that the first trial is the trial; that when
the evidence is fresh in the minds of witnesses, and the witnesses
are all available, their evidence shall be presented to the jury,
and the verdict rendered upon that shall become a part of the
record and it shall be for the court thereafter to determine whit
the law is and how it shall be applied upon that state of facts.'"
The English rule on this point has also lately been introduced
into the procedure of several of the American states. Thus the
code of criminal procedure of New York enacts that judgment
shall be given without regard to technical errors or exceptions
which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties. The
Pennsylvania Code also contains a similar provision, though according to the testimony of a prominent member of the IPhiladelphia Bar it has been observed in but one case during the last
three years. The rule is also in force in Massachusetts and New
Hampshire and has recently been incorporated into the procedure
of Wisconsin. The same principle was also incorporated in the act
creating the municipal court of Chicago. This act declares that
no order or judgment of the municipal-court shall be reversed by
the Appellate Court or the Supreme Court unless they shall be satisfied that the order or judgment was contrary to law and the evidence or resulted from substantial errors directly affecting the matters at issue. Moreover, the Appellate Court is empowered to enter
such order or judgment as in its opinion the municipal court
ought to have entered, instead of sending the case back for
retrial.
No good reason appears to us why this sensible rule of
procedure should not be strictly followed by every court of review
in the land, whether federal or state. Some of the actual instances
of reversal for error by the state courts, put in evidence before
the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives at its
hearing on January 12, are simply shocking and would not be
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tolerated anywhere outside of the United States. And they are
not confined to the procedure of the United States, as was pointed
out by Judge ioon, a member of the Judiciary Committee, who
asserted that federal procedure is about as archaic and as far
behind the times as that of any of the states. (Hearings, p. 37.)
The present practice, by which common sense is often sacrificed to technicality, substance to form, and justice to injustice,
cannot be reconciled with the sensible rule once laid down by
Chief Justice Marshall that "It is desirable to terminate every
case upon its real merits if these merits are fairly before the
court, and to put an end to litigation where it is in the power of
the court so to do." (Church vs. Hubbart, 2 Cranch, 232.)
No honest judge would dispute the soundness of this rule, not
even those who allow new trials for the pettiest of errors, yet,
in practice, they are constantly violating the rule, to the discredit of the judiciary, the promotion of litigation, the defeat of
justice and the encouragement of lawlessness. We need, above
all, a change of attitude upon the part of the bench and bar
in regard to the fundamental purposes of a system of criminal
justice and of the right of society to be protected from the criminal class. The law schools should train those who are to fill the
ranks of the legal profession to look with contempt upon every
attempt to sacrifice substantial justice to technicality. Speaking
on this point before the Judiciary Committee at its hearing on
January 12, Dean Lawson, of the University of iMissouri Law
School, remarked:
"In every other branch of science-and we must treat law as a sciencethe teachers are teaching the science of to-day, wherever it may come
from.

We are teaching, or have to teach, the legal science of the days

of the Tudors, of the early ages, when it comes to the administration of
the criminal law. If in other professions and businesses things had gone
as badly as they have in the legal profession--and I think it is a great
reproach to the lawyers-we would still, instead of using the Hoe press, be
using the old press run by hand, and instead of going by great railroads from
one end of the continent to the other, we would still be using the stagecoach; and it is one of the most peculiar things that the lawyers seem

not to have noticed that in matters of legal practice we are, in most of
the Western states, where we were and where England, from which we
took our practice, was, over a century ago. But the best thing that can be
said to-day is that the lawyers are getting to recognize the necessity."

The bill now before Congress ought to pass without opposition. It has the approval of the best lawyers of the country and
the wisdom of the reform-which it proposes to introduce has been
14
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demonstrated beyond all question by the experience of England
and the few American states where it has been tried. It does not
take away from the accused any right to which he is justly
entitled, but is designed simply to eliminate unnecessary delays
which often result in the defeat of justice. As President Taft has
well remarked, it is the duty of the United States to take the lead
and adopt a system of procedure which will serve as a model for
the states to follow. The opportunity to make an important
beginning is now squarely before Congress and we hope it will
have the good sense and patriotism to take advantage of it.
J. W. G.
THE RECENT DEcisioN OF THE ILLINOIS SUPREmE COURT ON

LAw.-The decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in
People vs. Joyce, handed down February 16, 1910, and reported
in 40 Natl. Corp. Repr. 48, in which the court overthrew the entire
Parole Law of 1899, has created no small degree of consternation
among lawyers, criminologists, and, indeed, all members of the
community. This law is the one under which the great majority
of those convicted of infamous crimes during the last ten years
have been sentenced, and while the opinion of the court in defeating the law of 1899 at the same time revives the earlier act of
1895, as amended in 1897, and authorizes a resentencing of convicts under the earlier acts without the' necessity of a retrial, the
decision, nevertheless, if it stands, seems likely to give rise to
numerous questions of great difficulty and embarrassment and not
improbably to open the prison doors to many who are serving
sentences justly imposed for crimes committed. The subsequent
action of the court in allowing a rehearing in the case and staying proceedings therein has afforded some ground for hope that
the court may ultimately change its ruling, and sustain the
essential provisions of the law of 1899.
So far as the fundamental principles of the parole system
are concerned, the opinion of the court seems unimportant. There
is no intimation that those principles are necessarily incompatible
with the provisions of the State Constitution. The court had
already, in the case of George vs. The People, 167 Ill. 4,7, sustained the constitutionality of the former parole law. The latter
case in no way shakes the authority of the earlier one. In fact,
the later case, in overthrowing the parole law of 1899, expressly
holds the former parole law to be revived and in full force and
THE PAROLE
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effect. The decision, then, clearly deals no blow to the essential
principles-of the parole system.
The actual decision of the court proceeds upon extremely
technical lines. The State Constitution provides that no Act shall
embrace more than one subject, and that that subject shall be
expressed in its title. It also provides that bills making appropriations for the salaries of officers of the government shall contain ao provision on any other subject. The title of the Parole
Law of 1899 was, "An Act to revise the law in relation to the
sentence and commitment of persons convicted of crime and
providing for a system of parole, and to prdvide compensation
for the officers of said system of parole." The act contained
provisions as to the various matters mentioned in the title. It
provided for indeterminate sentences, for release of prisoners on
parole, and for their discharge, and it appropriated money to pay
the salaries of the parole officers. The act was. attacked as embracing more than one subject, and therefore violating the
constitutional provision above referred to. The court, however,
denied this contention. It held that the Act embraced only one
main subject, i. e., the establishment of a parole system, and that
the other provisions were connected with, and properly incidental
to, this main subject, and that the Act therefore embraced only
one subject and not three, separate subjects.
The court, however, held the entire act was made unconstitutional by the two sections contained in it making appropriations
for salaries. It held that these sections could not be rejected and
the rest of the act sustained, notwithstanding the fact that the
court had already declared the main purpose of the act to
be the establishment of a parole system, and notwithstanding the
fact that the Act would be left a perfect and complete law for
the accomplishment of this main purpose, with the incidental provision for salaries stricken out. A previous case (Matthews vs.
People, 202 Ill. 889, 410), where it was said that similarly unconstitutional provisions for appropriations might be rejected from
an act, and the rest of the act sustained, was distinguished, because in the former case the title of the act was silent on the
subject of the appropriation, while in the Parole Law the subject
of appropriation is made a part of the title. The court says
that since the title includes both the subject of the parole system
and the appropriation for the salaries, and under the Constitution
both cannot stand together in one bill, the court cannot "make
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a choice," and retain the parole system part of the Act and reject
the appropriation part.
This position of the court has created great astonishment
among lawyers. It is settled law that though an act contains
unconstitutional provisions, if these are merely incidental to the
main purpose of the act, and can be separated from the rest of
the act, and rejected, and still leave the remainder an effective law for the accomplishment of the main purposes for which
it was enacted, the unconstitutional part will be rejected, and
the rest of the act sustained. This process of rejection is in
every case subject to the theoretical objection that the expressed
intent of the Legislature is departed from, and that that body
might not have been willing to pass the retained portions of the
act except in connection with the rejected part, on the supposition
that the entire act was in all its parts a valid and enforceable law.
In other words, the process of rejection of a part only of an
act implies a judgment by the court as to what the Legislative
intent would be in the emergency created by the partial unconstitutionality of the act. It is therefore no argument against rejection that the court must "make a choice." It must necessarily do
so in all cases of this character. It must, in all cases of this kind,
decide whether if the alternative of no act at all, or of an act
shorn of the unconstitutional features, were presented to the Legislature it would choose the latter alternative. In the case of the
Parole Act the presumption in favor of a Legislative choice of the
partial act rather than of no act at all, would seem extraordinarily
clear. To suppose that the Legislature would not have passed the
parole system part of the law unless it could also in the same act
pass the appropriation provision (though it could provide for the
appropriation just as well in an independent act), would be to
impute to the Legislature a degree of imbecility which its severest
critics have never charged against it.
The fact that the title includes the subject of appropriations
seems to be no reason for distinguishing this case from former
cases where it has been said that the appropriation provisions of
acts might be 'ejected and the rest sustained. The court says it
cannot choose between the different subjects included in the title.
But the court decided that the main purpose of the act was the
parole system and the other provisions of the act subordinate to
this main purpose. If this is true of the body of the act, it is
equally true of the title. Then, if the court would reject the

THE ILLINOIS PAROLE DECISION.

separate and incidental provision for appropriation in the absence
of any mention of this subject in the title, why should a mention
of it in the title make it any the less separate and incidental and
capable of rejection? Let us see what the choice was, which was
presented to the court, and which it professed itself unable to
make. It was a choice between the two subjects of the title, the
parole system and the appropriation. But clearly the court could
not choose the appropriation part of the act and reject the parole
system part. That would leave an appropriation with nothing to
appropriate for. So really the only possible choice among the
subjects mentioned in the title was a choice in favor of the parole
system part of the act. From every point of view, the action of
the court in defeating the entire act instead of merely rejecting
the appropriation provisions seems contrary to the court's prior
decisions and to sound reason; 'and it is to be hoped that it will
upon rehearing revise its judgment in this respect.
The overthrown parole law provided for the discharge of
prisoners by the Board of Pardons, and prisoners were sentenced
to remain confined until so discharged (but not exceeding the
maximum term fixed by law for the crime). This provision was
attacked as giving judicial powers to the Board of Pardons, but
the court found it unnecessary to pass upon the question, the act
being held invalid upon the ground above referred to.
The indeterminate sentence feature of the act was attacked
in People vs. Deluce, 237 Ill. 541, on the ground that the sentence
under the act was not made proportionate to the offense. The
court says: "This court fully considered the constitutionality of
this act on the matters involved in People vs. State Reformatory,
148 1ll. 413, and People vs. George, 167 fli. 447. These decisions
fully cover all the points raised in the briefs. We see no reason
to change or add to what we there stated." In view of this language, it is a little surprising to find the court referring to the
constitutionality of the indeterminate sentence provisions of the
Parole Act, as a matter upon which it does not decide, and which
it apparently considers as open to question. It would seem that
the constitutionality of these provisions was fully established by
prior decisions of the court. Similar provisions have been sustained generally in other states. Miller vs. State, 149 Ind. 607;
Commonwealth vs. Brown, 167 Mass. 144; Attorney General vs.
Peters, 43 Ohio St. 629; People vs. Warden of Sing Sing Prison,
39 Misc. (N; Y.) 115, Ex parte Howard, 72 Kan. 275; The State
vs. Page, 60 Kan. 664.
L. E. G.
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176. (3) We come now to the third of the questions raised
in regard to the individual's right to free life,-the question under
what conditions that right may be forfeited; the question, in
other words, of the state's right of punishment. The right (i. e.,
the power secured by social recognition) of free life in every man
rests on the assumed capacity in every man of free action contributory to social good, ("free" in the sense of determined by
the idea of a common good. Animals may and do contribute
to the good of man, but not thus "freely"). This right on the
part of associated men implies the right on their part to prevent
such actions as interfere with the possibility of free action contributory to social good. This constitutes the right of punishment, -the right so far to use force upon a person (to treat
him as an animal or a thing) as may be necessary to save others.
from this interference.
177. Under what conditions a person needs to be thus
dealt with, what particular actions on his part constitute such
an interference, is a question which can only be answered when
we have considered what powers in particular need to be secured
to individuals or to officials in order to the possibility of free
action of the kind described. Every such power is a right of
which the violation, if intended as a violation of a right, requires
a punishment, of which the kind and amount must depend on
'In this series of articles will be presented, from time to time, representative passages from the writings of those English and American thinkers
who have advanced a philosophy of penal law. Only those thinkers will be
selected who stand eminent in philosophical science and have treated penal
law as a part of their general philosophical system.

The series will be edited by Mr. Longwell, instructor in philosophy,

Mr. Kocourek, lecturer on jurisprudence, and Mr. Wigmore, professor of

law in Northwestern University.
Born, 1836; died, 1882. Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford University (Balliol College): He was the leading exponent at Oxford of the
principles of Kant and Hegel. His writings were critically adverse to the
empiric and utilitarian philosophies.

His

style is

one of

simple and convincing in English literature in this field.

the most lucid,

The extract here given forms Chapter L in his "Principles of Political

Obligation," which is virtually a philosophy of politics and law. It is found
on p. 486 if, vol. II, of his works (ed. Nettleship, i885-i888, London, Longmans, Green & Co.).
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the relative importance of the right and of the extent to which
its general exercise is threatened. Thus every theory of rights
in detail must be followed by, or indeed implies, a corresponding
theory of punishment in detail, a theory which considers what
particular acts are punishable, and how they should be 'punished.
The latter cannot precede the former: all that can be done here
is further to consider what general rules of punishment are implied
in the principle on which we hold all right of punishment to rest,
and how far in the actual practice of punishment that principle
has been realized.
178. It is commonly asked whether punishment according
to its proper nature is retributive or preventive or reformatory.
The true answer is that it is and should be all three. The statement, however, that the pnishment of the criminal by the state
is retributive, though true in a sense that will be explained directly,
yet so readily lends itself to a misunderstanding, that it is perhaps best avoided. It is not true in the sense that in legal punishment as it should be there survives any element of private
vengeance, of the desire on the part of the individual who has
received a hurt from another to inflict an equivalent hurt in
return. It is true that the beginning of punishment by the state
first appears in the form of a regulation of private' vengeance,
but it is not therefore to be supposed that punishment by the
state is in any way a continuation of private vengeance. It is
the essence of the former to suppress and supersede the latter,
but it only does so gradually, just as rights in actuality are only
formed gradually. Private vengeance belongs to the state of
things in which rights are not as yet actualized; in the sense that
the powers which it is for the social good that a man should be
allowed to exercise, are not yet secured to him by society. In
proportion as they are actualized, the exercise of private vengeance must cease. A right of private vengeance is an impossibility; for, just so far as- the vengeance is private, the individual
in executing it is exercising a power not derived' from society
nor regulated by reference to social good, 'and such a power is
not a right. Hence the view commonly taken by writers of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries implies an entire. misconcep.tion of the nature of a right; the view, viz., that there first
existed rights of self-defense and self-vindication on the part of
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individuals in a state of nature, and that these came to be devolved on a power representing all individuals, so that the state's
right of using force against those men who use or threaten
force against other men, is merely the sum or equivalent of the
private rights which individuals would severally possess if there
were no public equivalent for them. This is to suppose that to
have been a right which in truth, under the supposed conditions,
would merely have been animal impulse and power, and public
right (which is a pleonasm, for all right is public) to have resulted from the combination of these animal impulses and powers;
it is to suppose that from a state of things in which "homo
homini lupus," by mere combination of wolfish impulses, there
could result the state of things in which "homo homini deus."
179. In a state of things in which private vengeance for
hurt inflicted was the universal practice, there could be no rights
at all. In the most primitive society in which rights can exist,
it must at least within the limits of the family be suppressed by
that authority of the family or its head which first constitutes
rights. In such a society it is only on the members of another
family that a ,man may retaliate at pleasure a wrong done to
him, and then the vengeance is not, strictly speaking, taken by
individual upon individual, though individuals may be severally
the agent and patient of it, but by family upon family. Just
because there is as yet no idea of a state independent of ties of
birth, much less of a universal society from relation to which 'a
man derives rights, there is no idea of rights attaching to him
as a citizen or as a man, but only as a member of a family. That
social right, which is at once a right of society over the individual, and a right which society communicates and secures to the
individual, appears, so far, only as a control. exercised by the
family over its members in their dealings with each other, as an
authorization which it gives them in prosecuting their quarrels
with members of another family, and at the same time to a
certain extent as a limitation on the manner in which feuds between families may be carried on, a limitation generally dependent
on some religious authority equally recognized by the families
at feud.
180. From this state of things it is a long step to the
r~gime of law in a duly constituted state. Under it the arm of
21
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the state alone is the organ through which force may be exercised on the individual; the individual is prohibited from averting
violence by violence, except so far as is necessary for the immediate protection of life, and altogether from avenging wrong
done to him, on the understanding that the society, of which he
is an organ, and from which he derives his rights, being injured
in every injury to him, duly protects him against injury, and
when it fails to prevent such injury from being done, inflicts
such punishment on the offender as is necessary for future protection. But the process from the one state of things to the
other, though a long one, consists in the further .development
of that social right' which, properly speaking, was the only right
the individual ever had, and from the first, or ever since a permanent family tie existed, was present as a qualifying and restraining element in the exercise of private vengeance so far as
that exercise partook at all in the nature of a right. The process
is not a continuance of private vengeance under altered forms,
but a gradual suppression of it by the fuller realization of the
higher principle which all along controlled it.
181. But it will be asked, how upon this view of the nature
of punishment as inflicted by the state it can be considered retributory. If no private vengeance, no vengeance of the injured individual, is involved in punishment, there can be no vengeance in
it. at all. The conception of vengeance is quite inappropriate to
the action of society or the state on the criminal. The state cannot be supposed capable of vindictive passion. Nor, if the essence
of crime is a wrong done to society, does it admit of retaliation
upon the person committing it. A hurt done to an individual
can be requited by the infliction of a like hurt upon the person
who has done it; but no equivalent of wrong done to society can
be paid back to the doer of it.
--"Social right," i. e., right belonging to a society of persons recognizing
a common good, and belonging through membership of the society to the

several persons constituting it. The society to which the right belongs is,
in principle or possibility, a society of all men as rendered capable. of
free intercourse with each other by the organization of the state. Actually
at first it is only this or that family; then some association of families;
finally the state, as including all other forms of association, reconciling the
rights which arise out of them, and thus the most perfect medium through
which the individual can contribute to the good of mankind and mankind
to his.
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182. It is true that there is such a thing as a national
desire for revenge' (France and Germany); and if a state - a
nation organized in a certain way, why should it not be "capable
of vindictive passion"? No doubt there is a unity of feeling
among the members of
nation which makes them feel any loss
of strength, real or apparent, sustained by the nation in its corporate character, as a hurt or disgrace to themselves, which they
instinctively desire to revenge. The corporate feeling is so strong
that individuals feel themselves severally hurt in the supposed
hurt of the nation. But when it is said that a crime is an offense
against the state, it is not meant that the body of persons
forming the nation feel any hurt in the sense in which the person
robbed or wounded does, such a hurt as excites a natural desire
for revenge. What is meant is that there is a violation of a
system of rights which the nation has, no doubt, an interest in
maintaining, but a purely social interest, quite different from
the egoistic interest of the individual of which the desire for
vengeance is a form. A nation is capable of vindictive feeling,
but not so a nation as acting through the medium of a settled,
impartial, general law for the maintenance of rights, and that
is what we mean when we talk of the state as that against which
crimes are committed and which punishes them.
183. It is true that when a crime of a certain sort, e. g., a
cold-blooded murder, has been committed, a popular sympathy
with the sufferer is excited, which expresses itself in the wish to
"serve out" the murderer. This has some resemblance to the
desire for personal revenge, but is really quite different, because
not egoistic. Indignation against wrong done to another has
nothing in common with a desire to revenge a wrong done to
oneself. It borrows the language of private revenge, just as the
love of God borrows the language of sensuous affection. Such
indignation is inseparable from the interest in'social well-being,
and along with it is the chief agent in the establishment and
maintenance of legal punishment. Law, indeed, is necessarily
general, while indignation is particular in its reference; and
accordingly the treatment of any particular crime, so far as
determined by law, cannot correspond with the indignation which
"'Happy shall be he that rewardeth thee as thou hast served us."
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the crime excites; but the law merely determines the general
category under which. the crime falls, and fixes certain limits to
the punishment that may be inflicted under that category. Within
those limits discretion is left to the judge as to the sentence that
he passes, and his sentence is in part influenced by the sort of
indignation which in the given state of public sentiment the crime
is calculated to excite; though generally much more by his opinion as to the amount of terror required for the prevention of
prevalent crime. Now what is it in punishment that this indignation demands? If not the sole foundation of public punishment,
it is yet inseparable from that public interest, on which the system
of rights, with the corresponding system of punishments protective of rights, depends. In whatever sense then this indignation
demands retribution in punishment, in that sense retribution
would seem to be a necessary element in punishment. It demands
retribution in the sense of demanding that the criminal should
have his due, should be dealt with- according to his deserts, should
be punished justly.
181. This is quite a different thing from an equivalence
between the amount of suffering inflicted by the criminal and
that which he sustains in punishment. The amount of suffering
which is caused by any crime is really as incalculable as that
which the criminal endures in, punishment, whatever the punishment. It is only in the case of death for murder that there is
any appearance of equivalence between the two sufferings, and
in this case the appearance is quite superficial. The suffering
involved in death depends almost entirely on the circumstances,
which are absolutely different in the case of the murdered man
and in that of the man executed for murder. When a man is
imprisoned with hard labor for robbery, there is not even an
appearance of equivalence of suffering between the crime and the
punishment. In what then does the justice of a punishment, or
its correspondence with the criminal's deserts. consist? It will
not do to say that these terms merely represent the result of an
association of ideas between *a crime and the penalty which we
are accustomed to see inflicted on it; that society has come to
attach certain penalties to certain actions as a result of the experience (1) of suffering and loss caused by those acts, and (2)
of the kind of suffering of which the expectation will deter men
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from doing them; and that these penalties having become customary, the onlookers and the criminal himself, when one of them is inflicted, feel that he has got what was to be expected, and call
it his due or desert or a just punishment. If this were the true
account of the matter, there would be nothing to explain the
difference between the emotion excited by the spectacle of a just
punishment inflicted, or the demand that it should be inflicted,.
on the one side, and on the other that excited by the sight of
physical suffering, following according to the usual course of
things upon a physical combination of circumstances, or the
expectation that such suffering will follow. If it is said that the
difference is explained by the fact that in the one case both the
antecedent (the criminal act) and the consequent represent voluntary human agency, while in the other they do not, we reply,
just so, but for that reason the conception of a punishment as
just differs wholly from any conception of it that could result
either from its being customary, or from the infliction of such
punishment having been commonly found a means for protecting
us against hurt.
185. The idea of punishment implies on the side of the
person punished at once a capacity for determination by the conception *of a common or public good, or, in other words, a practical understanding of the nature of rights as founded on relations to such public good, and an actual violation of a right or
omission to fulfill an obligation, the right or obligation being one
of which the agent might have been aware and the violation or
omission one which he might have prevented. On the side of
the authority punishing, it implies equally a conception of right
founded on relation to public good, and one which, unlike that on
the part of the criminal, is realized in act; a conception of which
the punitive act, as founded on a consideration of what is necessary for the maintenance of rights, is the logical expression. A
punishment is unjust if either element is absent; if either the act
punished is not a violation of known rights or an omission to
fulfill known obligations of a kind which the agent might have
prevented, or the punishment is one that is not required for the
maintenance of rights, or (which comes to the same thing), if
the ostensible rights for the maintenance of which the punishment
is required are not real rights, are not liberties of action or
acquisition which there is any real public interest in maintaining.
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186. When the specified conditions of just punishment are
fulfilled, the person punished himself recognizes it as just, as
his due or desert, and it is so recognized by the onlooker who
thinks himself into the situation. 'The criminal, being susceptible
to the idea of public good, and through it to -the idea of rights,
though this idea has not been strong enough to regulate his
-actions, sees in the punishment its natural expression. He sees
that the punishment is his own act and returning on himself, in
the sense that it is the necessary outcome of his act in a society
governed by the conception of rights, a conception which he appreciates and to which he does involuntary reverence.
It is the outcome of his act, or his act returning upon himself, in a different way from that in which a man's act returns
on himself when, having misused his body, he is visited according
to physical necessity by painful consequences. The cause of the
suffering which the act entails in the one case is the relation of
the act to a society governed by the conception of rights; in
the other it is not. For that reason, the painful consequence of
the act to the doer in the one case is, in the other is not, properly a punishmeit. We do indeed commonly speak of the painful
consequences of imprudent or immoral acts ("immoral" as distinct from "illegal") as a punishment of them, but this is either
metaphorically or because we think of the course of the world
as regulated by a divine sovereign, whom we conceive as a maintainer of rights like the sovereign of a state. We may think
of it as divinely regulated, and so regulated with a view to the
realization of moral good, but we shall still not be warranted
in speaking of the sufferings which follow in the course of nature
upon certain kinds of conduct as punishments, according to
the distinctive sense in which crime is punished, unless we suppose
the maintenance of rights to b'e the object of the moral government of the world,-which is to put the cart before the horse,
for, as we have seen, rights are relative to morality, not morality
to rights (the ground on which certain liberties of action and
acquisition should be guaranteed as rights being that they are
conditions of the moral perfection of society).
While there would be reason, then, is against those who
say that the punishment of crime is merely preventive, in saying
that it is also retributive, if the needed correction of the "merely
26
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preventive" doctrine could not be more accurately stated, it would
seem that the truth can be more accurately stated by the proposition that punishment is not justified unless it is just, and that
it is not just unless the act punished is an intentional violation
of real right or neglect of real obligation -which the agent could
have avoided (i. e., unless the agent knowingly and by intentional
act interferes with some freedom of action or acquisition which
there is a public interest in maintaining), and unless the future
maintenance of rights requires that the criminal be dealt with
as he is in the punishment.'
187. It is clear, however, that this requirement, that punishment of crime should be just, may be covered by the statement that in its proper nature it is preventive, if the nature of
that which is to be prevented by it is sufficiently defined. Its
proper function is, in the interest of rights that are genuine (in
the sense explained), to prevent actions of the kind described by
associating in the mind of every possible doer of them a certain
terror with the contemplation of the act,-such terror as is necessary on the whole to protect the rights threatened by such action. The whipping of an ill-behaved dog is preventive, but not
preventive in the sense in which the punishment of crime is so,
because (1) the dog's ill conduct is not an intentional violation
of a right or neglect of a known obligation, the dog having no
conception of right or obligation, and (2) for the same reason
the whipping does not lead to the association of terror in the
minds of other dogs with the violation of rights and neglect of
obligations. To shoot men down who resist a successful coup
d'6tat may be effectually preventive of further resistance to the
government established by the coap d'tat,
but it does not satisfy
the true idea of punishment, because the terror produced by the
massacre is not necessary for the protection of genuine rights,
rights founded on public interest. To hang men for sheep-stealing, again, does not satisfy the idea; because, though it is a genuine right that sheep-stealing violates, in a society where there
was any decent reconciliation of rights no such terror as is
'The conceptions of the- just and of justice implied in this statement
of the conditions of just punishment may be expressed briefly as follows:
"The just" =that complex of social conditions which for each individual is
necessary to enable him to realize his capacity of contributing to social good.
"Justice" is the habit of mind which leads us to respect those conditions in
dealing with others,-not to interfere with them so' far as they already exist,
and to bring them into existence so far as they are not found in existence.
27
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caused by the punishment of death would be required for the
protection of the right. It is because the theory that punishment is "merely preventive" favors the notion that the repetition
of any action which any sufficient body of men find inconvenient
may justifiably be prevented by any sort of terror that may be
convenient for the purpose, that it requires to be guarded by
substituting for the qualifying "merely" a statement of what it is
which the justifiable punishment prevents and why it prevents it.
188. But does our theory, after all has been said about
the wrongness of punishment that is not just, afford any standard for the apportionment of just punishment, any criterion of
the amount of interference with a criminal's personal rights that
is appropriate to his crime, except such as is afforded by a prevalent impression among men as to what is necessary for their
security? Can we construe it so as to afford such a criterion,
without at the same time condemning a great deal of punishment which yet society could be never brought to dispense with?
Does it really admit of being applied at all in the presence of
the admitted impossibility of ascertaining the degree of moral
guilt of criminals, as depending on their state of character or
habitual motives? How, according to it, can we justify punishments inflicted in the case of "culpable negligence," e. g., when
an enginedriver, by careless driving, for which we think very
little the worse of him, is the occasion of a bad accident, and is
heavily punished in consequence?
189. It is true that there can be no a priori criterion of
just punishment, except of an abstract and negative kind. We
may say that no punishment is just, unless the rights which it
serves to protect are powers on the part of individuals or corporations of which the general maintenance is necessary to the
well-being of society on the whole, and unless the terror which
the punishment is calculated to inspire is necessary for their
maiitenance. For a positive and detailed criterion of just punishment, we must wait till a system of rights has been established in which the claims of all men, as founded on their capacities for contributing to social well-being, are perfectly harmonized, and till experience has shown the degree and kind of terror
with which men must be affected in order to the suppression of
the anti-social tendencies which might lead to the violation of
such a system of rights., And this is perhaps equivalent to saying that no complete 6riterion of just punishment can be arrived
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at till punishment is no longer necessary; for the state of things
supposed could scarcely be realized without bringing with it an
extinction of the tendencies which state-punishment is needed to
suppress.
Meanwhile there is no method of approximation to
justice in punishment but that which consists in gradually making the system of established rights just, i. e., in harmonizing
the true claims of all men, and in discovering by experience the
really efficient means of restraining tendencies to violation of
rights. An intentional violation of a right must be punished,
whether the right violated is one that should be a right or not,
on the principle that social well-being suffers more from violation
of any established right, whatever the nature of the right, than
from the establishment as a right of a power which should not
be so established; and it can only be punished in the way which
for the time is thought most efficient by the maintainers of law
for protecting the right in question by associating terror with
its violation. This, however, does not alter the moral duty, on
the part of the society authorizing the punishment, to make its
punishments just by making the system of rights which it maintains just. The justice of the punishment depends on the justice of the general system of rights; not merely on the propriety
with reference to social well-being of maintaining this or that
particular right which the crime punished violates, but on the
question whether the social organization in which a criminal has
lived and acted is one that has given him a fair chance of not
being a criminal.
19Q. We *are apt to think that the justice of a punishment
depends on some sort of equality between its magnitude and that
of the crime punished, but this notion arises from a confusion of
punishment as inflicted by the state for a wrong done to society
vith compensation to the individual for damage done "him.
Neither a crime nor its punishment admits of strictly quantitative measurement. It may be said, indeed, that the greater the
crime the heavier should be its punishment, but this is only true
if by the "heavier punishment" is understood that with which
most terror is associated in the popular imagination, and if the
conception of the "greater crime" is taken on the one hand to
exclude any estimation of the degree of moral guilt, and, on the
other hand, to be determined by an estimate not only of the importance in the social system of the right violated by the crime,
but of the amount of terror that needs to be associated with the
29
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crime in the general apprehension in order to its prevention.
But when its terms are thus understood, the statement that the
greater the crime the heavier should be its punishment, becomes
an identical proposition. It amounts to this, that the crime
which requires most terror to be associated with it in order to
its prevention should have most terror thus associated with it.
191. But why do the terms "heavier punishment" and
"greater crime" need to be thus understood? Why should not
the "greater crime" be understood to mean the crime implying
most moral wickedness, or partly this, partly the crime which
violates the more important kind of right? Why should a consideration of the amount of terror that needs to be associated
with it in order to its prevention enter into the determination of
the "greater crime" at all? Why again should not the "heavier
punishment" mean simply that in which the person punished actually suffers most pain? Why should it be taken to mean thxt
with which most terror is associated upon the contemplation?
In short, is not the proposition in question at once true and
significant in the sense that the crime which implies the most
moral depravity, or violates the most important right (such as
the right to life), or which does both, should be visited with the
punishment that involves most pain to the sufferer?
'192. The answer is: As regards heaviness of punishment,
it is not in the power of the state to regulate the amount of
pain which it causes to the person whom it punishes. If it could
only punish justly by making this pain proportionate in each
case to the depravity implied in the crime, it could not punish
justly at all. The amount of pain which any kind of punishment causes to the particular person depends on his temperament
and circumstances, which neither the state nor its agent, the
judge, can ascertain.
But if it could be ascertained, and if
(which is equally impossible) the amount of depravity implied in
each particular crime could be ascertained likewise in order to
make the pain of the punishment proportionate to the depravity,
a different punishment would have to be inflicted in each case
according to the temperament and circumstances of the criminal.
There would be an end to all general rules of punishment.
193. In truth, however, the state in its capacity as the
sustainer of rights (and it is in this capacity that it punishes)
has nothing to do with the amount of moral depravity in the
criminal, and the primary reference in punishment, as inflicted
30
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by the state, is not to the effect of the punishment on the person
punished, but to its effect on others. The considerations determining its amount should be prospective rather than retrospective. In the crime a right has been violated. No punishment
can undo what has been done, or make good the wrong to the person who has suffered. What it can do is to make less likely the
doing of a similar wrong -in other cases. Its object, therefore,
is not to cause pain to the criminal for the sake of causing it,
nor chiefly for the sake of preventing him, individually, from
committing the crime again, but to associate terror with the contemplation of the crime in the mind of others who might be
tempted to commit it. And this object, unlike that of making
the pain of the punishment commensurate with the guilt of the
criminal, is in the main attainable. The effect of the spectacle
of punishment on the onlooker is independent of any minute inquiry into the degree to which it affects the particular criminal.
The attachment of equal penalties to offenses that are alike in
respect of the importance of the rights which they violate, and
in respect of the ordinary temptations to them, will, on the whole,
lead to the association of an equal amount of terror with the
prospect of committing like offenses in the public mind. When
the circumstances, indeed, of two criminals guilty of offenses alike
in both the above respects are very greatly and obviously different, so different as to make the operation of the same penalty
upon them very conspicuously different, then the penalty may be
varied without interfering with its terrifying effect on the public mind. We will suppose, e. g., that a fraud on the pa*t of a
respectable banker is equivalent, both in respect of the rights
which it violates and of the terror needed to prevent the recurrence of like offenses, to a burglary. It will not follow because
the burglary is punished by imprisonment with hard labor that
hard labor should be inflicted on the fraudulent banker likewise.
The infliction of hard labor is in everyone's apprehension so
different to the banker from what it is to the burglar, that its
infliction is not needed in order to equalize the terror which the
popular imagination associates with the punishment in the two
cases.
19,1. On the same principle may be justified the consideration of extenuating circumstances in the infliction of punishment.
In fact, whether under that name or another, they are taken
account of in the administration of criminal law among all civ-
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ilized nations. "Extenuating circumstances" is not a phrase in
use among our lawyers, but in fact the consideration of them
does constantly, with the approval of the judge, convert what
would otherwise have been conviction for murder into conviction
for manslaughter, and when there has been conviction for murder, leads to the commutation of the sentence. This fact is often
taken to show that the degree of moral depravity on the part
of the criminal, the question of his character and motive, is and
must be considered in determining the punishment due to him.
In 'truth, however, "extenuating circumstances" may very well
make a difference in the kind of terror which needs to be associated with a crime in order to the future protection of rights,
and under certain conditions the consideration of them may be
sufficiently justified on this ground. Suppose a theft by a starving man, or a hare shot by an angry farmer whose corn it i'
devouring. These are crimes, but crimes under such extenuating
circumstances that there is no need to associate very serious terror with them in order to the protection of the essential rights
of property. In the latter case the right which the farmer violates is one which perhaps might be disallowed altogether without
interference with any right which society is interested in maintaining. In the former case the right violated is a primary and
essential one; one which, where there are many starving people, is
in fact pretty sure to be protected by the most stringent penalties. And it might be argued that on the principle stated this
is as it should be; that, so far from the hunger of the thief being a reason for lightening his punishment, it is a reason for increasing it, in order that the special temptation to steal when
far gone in hunger may, if possible, be neutralized by a special
terror associated with the commission of the crime under thosq
conditions.
But this would be a one-sided application of the
principle. It is not the business of the state to protect one.
order of rights specially, but all rights equally. It ought not,
therefore, to protect a certain order of rights by associating
special terror with the violation of them, when the special temptation to their violation itself implies a violation of right in the
persons of those who are so tempted, as is the case when a general danger to property arises from the fact that many people
are on the edge of starvation. The attempt to do so is at once
ineffectual and diverts attention from the true way of protecting
,the endangered right, which is to prevent people from falling
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into a state of starvation. In any tolerably organized society
the condition of a man ordinarily honest and industrious, who is
driven to theft by hunger, will be so abnormal that very little
terror needs to be associated with the crime as so committed in
order to maintain the sanctity of property in the general imagination. Suppose again a man to be killed in a quarrel arising
out of his having tampered with the fidelity of his neighbor's
wife. In such a case "extenuating circumstances" may fairly be
pleaded against the infliction of the extremest penalty, becausethe extremist terror does not need to be associated with homicide,
as committed under such conditions, in order to the general protection of human life, and because the attempt so to associate
it would tend, so far as successful, to weaken the general sense of
the wrong-the breach of family right-involved in the act
which, in the case supposed, provokes the homicide.
195. "After all," it may be said, "this is a far-fetched
way of explaining the admission of extenuating circumstances as
modifying the punishment of crime. Why so strenuously avoid the
simpler explanation, that extenuating circumstances are taken into
account because they are held to modify the moral guilt of the
crime? Is not their recognition a practical proof that the punishment of a crime by the state represents the moral disapproval
of the community? Does it not show that, however imperfectly
the amount of punishment inflicted on a crime may in fact correspond to its moral wickedness, it is generally felt that it ought
to do so?"
196. The answer is that there are two reasons for holding
that the state neither can nor should attempt to adjust the
amount of punishment which it inflicts on a crime to the degree
of moral depravity which the crime implies. (1) That the degree of moral depravity implied in any crime is unascertainable.
It depends on the motive of the crime, and on this as part of the
g neral character of the agent; *on the relation in which the
habitual set of his character stands to the character habitually
set on the pursuit of goodness. No one can ascertain this -in regard to himself. He may know that he ig always far from being
what he ought -to be; that one particular action of his represents on the whole, with much admixture of inferior motives, the
better tendency; another, with some admixture of better motives,
the worse. But any question in regard to the degree of moral
goodness or badness in any action of his own or of his most
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intimate friend is quite unanswerable. Much less can a judge or
jury answer such a question in.regard to an unknown criminal.
We may be sure, indeed, that any ordinary crime-nay, perhaps,
even that of the "disinterested rebel"--implies the operation of
some motive which is morally bad, for though it is not necessarily the worst men who come into conflict with established
rights, it probably never can be the best; but the degree of badness implied in such a conflict in any particular case is .quite
beyond our ken, and it is this degree that must be ascertained
if the amount of punishment which the state inflicts is to be
proportionate to the moral badness implied in the crime. (2) The
notion that the state should, if it could, adjust the amount of
punishment which it inflicts on a crime to the moral wickedness of the crime, rests on a false view of the relation of the
slate to morality. It implies that it is the business of the state
to punish wickedness, as such. But it has no such business. It
cannot undertake to punish wickedness, as such, without vitiating
the disinterestedness of the effort to escape wickedness, and thus
checking the growth of a true goodness of the heart in the
attempt to promote a goodness which is merely on the surface.
This, however, is not to be understood as meaning that the punishment of crime serves no moral purpose. It does serve such a
purpose, and has its value in doing so, but only in the sense
tiat the protection of rights, and the association of terror with
their violation, is the condition antecedent of any general advance
in moral well-being.
197. The punishment of crime, then, neither is, nor can,
nor should be adjusted to the degree of moral depravity, properly so-called, which is implied in the crime. But it does not,
therefore, follow that it does not represent the disapproval which
the community feels for the crime. On the whole, making allowance for the fact that law and judicial custom vary more
slowly than popular feeling, it does represent such disapproval.
And the disapproval may fitly be called moral, so far as that
merely means that it is a disapproval relating to voluntary
action. But it is a disapproval founded on a sense of what
is necessary for the protection of rights, not on a judgment of
good and evil of that kind which we call conscience, when it is
applied to our own actions, and which is founded on an ideal
of moral goodness with which we compare our inward conduct
("inward," as representing motives and character). It is founded
34
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essentially on the outward aspect of a man's conduct, on the
view of it as related to the security and freedom in action and
acquisition of other members of society. It is true that this
distinction between the outward and inward aspects of conduct is
not present to the popular mind. It has not been recognized
by those who have been the agents in establishing the existing
law of crimes in civilized nations. As the state came to control
the individual or family in revenging hurts, and to substitute its
penalties for private vengeance, rules of- punishment came to be
enacted expressive of general disapproval, without any clear consciousness of what was the ground of the disapproval.' But in
fact it was by what have been just described as the outward consequences of conduct that a general disapproval of it was ordinarily excited. Its morality in the stricter or inward sense was
not matter of general social consideration.
Thus in the main
it has been on the ground of its interference with the general
security and freedom in action and acquisition, and in proportion to the apprehension excited by it in this respect, that conduct has been punished by the state. Thus the actual practice
of criminal law has on the whole corresponded to its true prin.
ciple. So far as this principle has been departed from, it has not
been because the moral badness of conduct, in the true or inward sense, has been taken account of in its treatment as a crime,
for this has not been. generally contemplated at all, but because
"religious" considerations have interfered.
Conduct which did
not call for punishment by the state as interfering with any true
rights (rights that should be rights) has been punished as "irreligious." This, however, did not mean that it was punished on
the ground of moral badness, properly so-called. It meant that
:t consequences were feared either as likely to weaken the belief
in some divine authority on which the established system of rights
was supposed to rest, or as likely to bring evil on the community
through provoking the wrath of some unseen power.
198. This account of the considerations which have regulated the punishment of crimes explains the severity with wlich
"criminal negligence" is in some cases punished, and that severity
is justified by the account given of the true principle of criminal
law, the principle, viz., that crime should be" punished accQrding
to the importance of the right which it violates, and to the
degree of terror which, in a well-organized society, needs to be
associated with the crime in order to the protection of the right.
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It cannot be held that the carelessness of an engine-driver who
overlooks a signal and causes a fatal accident, implies more
moral depravity than is implied in such negligence as all of us
are constantly guilty of. Considered with reference to the state
of mind of the agent, it is on a level with multitudes of actions
and omissions which are not punished at all. Yet the enginedriver would be found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to
penal servitude. The justification is not to be found in distinctions between different kinds of negligence on the part of different agents, but in the effect of the negligence in different
cases upoll the rights of others. In the case supposed, the most
important of all rights, the right to life, on the part of railway
passengers depends for its 'maintenance on the vigilance of the
drivers. Any preventable failure in such vigilance requires to
have sufficient terror associated with it in the mind of other
engine-drivers to prevent the recurrence of a like failure in vigilance. Such punishment is just, however generally -virtuous the
victim of it is, because it is necessary to the protection of rights
of which the protection is necessary to social well-being; and
the victim of it, in proportion to his sense of justice, which
means his habit of practically recognizing true rights, will recognize it as just.
199. On this principle -crimes committed in drunkenness
must be dealt with. Not only is all depravity of motive specially
inapplicable to them, since the motives actuating a drunken man
often seem to have little connection with his habitual character;
it is not always the case that a crime committed in drunkenness
is even intentional. When a man in a drunken rage kills another,
he no doubt intends to kill him, or at any rate to do him "grievous bodily harm," and perhaps the association of great penal
terror with such an offense may tend to restrain men from committing it even when drunk; butt when a drunken mother lies on
her child and smothers it, the hurt is not intentional but accidental. The drunkenness, however, is not accidental, but preventable by the influence of adequate motives. It is therefore
proper to treat such a violation of right, though committed unknowingly, as a crime, and to associate terror with it in the
popular imagination, in order to the protection of rights by
making people more careful about getting drunk, about allowiig or promoting drunkenness, and about looking after drunken
people. It is unreasonable, however, to do this and at the
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same time to associate so little terror, as in practice we do, with
the promotion of dangerous drunkenness. The case of a crime
committed by a drunkard is plainly distinguishable from that
of a crime committed by a lunatic, for the association of penal
terror with the latter would tend neither to prevent a lunatic
from committing a crime nor people from becoming lunatics.
200. The principle above stated, as that according to
nhich punishment by the state should be inflicted and regulated,
also justifies a distinction between crimes and civil injuries, i. e.,
between breaches of right for which the state inflicts punishment
without redress to the person injured, and those for which it procures or seeks to procure redress to the person injured without punishment of the person causing the injury. We are not here concerned with the history of this distinction (for which see Maine,
Ancient Law, chap. x, and W. E. Hearn, The Aryan Household,
chap. xix), nor with the question whether many breaches of right
now among us treated as civil injuries ought not to be treated as
crimes, but with the justification that exists for treating certain kinds of breach of right as cases in which the state should
interfere to procure redress for the person injured, but not in
the way of inflicting punishment on the injurer until he wilfully
resists the order to make redress. The principle of the distinction as ordinarily laid down, viz., that civil injuries "are violations of rights when considered in reference to the injury sustained by the individual," while crimes are "violations of rights
when considered in reference to their evil tendency as regards
the community at large" (Stephen, Book V, chap. i), is misleading; for if the well-being of the community did not suffer
in the hurt done to the individual, that hurt would not be a
violation of a right in the true sense at all, nor would the community have any ground for insisting that the hurt shall be
redressed, and for determining the mode in which it shall be redressed. A violation of right cannot in truth be considered
merely in relation to injury sustained by an individual, for, thus
considered, it would not be a violation of right. It may be said
that the state is only concerned in procuring redress for civil
injuries, because, if it left an individual to procure redress in
his own way, there would be no public peace. But there are
other and easier ways of preventing fighting than by procuring
redress of wrong. We prevent our dogs from fighting, not by
redressing wrongs which they sustain from each other (of
37
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wrongs as of rights they are in the proper sense incapable), but
by beating them or tying them up. The community would not
keep the peace by procuring redress for hurt or damage sustained by individuals, unless it conceived itself as having interest
in the security of individuals from hurt and damage, unless it
considered the hurt done to individuals as done to itself. The
true justification for treating some breaches of right as cases
merely for redress, others as cases for punishment, is that, in
order to the general protection of rights, with some it is necessary to associate a certain terror, with others it is not.
201. What, then, is the general ground of distinction between those -with which terror does, and those with which it
Clearly it is purposeless to
does not, need to be associated?
associate terror with breaches of right in the case where the
breaker does not know that he is violating a right, and is not
responsible for not knowing it. No association of terror with
such a breach of right can prevent men from similar breaches
under like conditions. In any case, therefore, in which, it is .to
begin with, open to dispute whether a- breach of right has been
committed at all, e. g., when it is a question whether a contract
has been really broken, owing to some doubt as to the interpretation of the contract or its application to a particular set of
circumstances,. or whether a commodity. of which someone is in
possession properly belongs to another,--in such a case, though
the judge finally decides that there has been a breach of right,
there is no ground for treating it as a crime or punishing it.
If, in the course of judicial inquiry, it turns out that there has
been fraud -by one or other of the parties to the litigation, a
criminal prosecution, having punishment, not redress, for its object, should properly supervene upon the civil -suit, unless the
consequences of the civil suit are incidentally such as to amount
to a sufficient punishment of the fraudulent party. Again, it is
purposeless to associate terror' with a breach of obligation which
the person committing it knows to be a breach, but of an obligation which he has no means of fulfilling, e. g., non-payment of
an. acknowledged debt by a man who, through ,no fault of his
own, is without means of paying it. It is only in cases of one
or other of the above kinds,--cases in which the breach of right,
supposing it to have been committed, has presumably arisen either
from inability to prevent it or from ignorance of the existence
of the right,-that it can be held as an -absolute rule to be no
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business of the state to interfere penally but only in the way of
restoring, so far as possible, the broken right.
202. But there are many cases of breach of right which
can neither be definitely reduced to one of the above kinds, nor
distinguished from them by any broad demarcation; cases in
which the breaker of a right has been ignorant of it, because
he has not cared to know, or in which his inability to fulfil it is
the result of negligence or extravagance. Whether these should
be treated penally or not, will depend partly on the seriousness
of the wrong done through avoidable ignorance or negligence,
partly on the sufficiency of the deterrent effect incidentally involved in the civil remedy. In the case e. g. of inability to pay
a debt through extravagance or recklessness, it may be unnecessary and inadvisable to treat the breach of right penally,
in consideration that-it is indirectly punished by poverty and the
loss of reputation incidental to bankruptcy, and the creditors
should not look to the state to protect them from the conThe negligence of a
sequences 'of lending on bad security.
trustee, again, may be indirectly punished by his being obliged
to make good the property lost through his neglect 'to the utmost of his means. This may serve as a sufficiently deterrent
example without the negligence being proceeded against criminally. Again, damage done to property by negligence is in
England dealt with civilly, not criminally; and it may be held
that in this case" the liability to civil action is a sufficient deterrent. On the other hand, negligence which, as iiegligence, is not
really distinguishable from the above, is rightly treated criminally when its consequences are more serious; e. g., that of the
railway servant whose negligence results in a fatal accident,
that of the bank director who allows a misleading statement of
accounts to be published, fraudulently perhaps in the eye of
the law, but in fact negligently. As a matter of principle, no
doubt, if intentional violation of the right of property is treated
as penal equally with the violation'of the right of life, the negligent violation should be treated as penal in the one case as much'
as in the other. But as the consequences of an action for
damages may be virtually though not ostensibly penal to the
person proceeded against, it may be convenient to leave those
negligences which do not, like the negligence of a railway
servant, affect the most important rights, or do not affect
39
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rights on a very large scale as those that of a bank director,
to be dealt with by the civil process.
203. The actual distinction between crimes and civil injuries in English law is no doubt largely accidental.

As the

historians of law point out, the civil process, having compensation, not punishment, for its object, is the form which the interference of the community for the maintenance of rights
originally takes.
The community, restraining private vengeance, helps the injured person to redress, and regulates the
way in which redress shall be obtained. This procedure no doubt
implies the conviction that the community is concerned in the
injury done to an individudl, but it is only by degrees that this
conviction becomes explicit, and that the community comes to
treat all preventable breaches of right as offenses against itself or
its sovereign representative; i. e., as crimes or penal; in the language of English law, "as breaches of the king's peace." Those
offenses are first so treated which happen to excite most public alarm, most fear for general safety (hence, among others,
anything thought sacrilegious).
In a country like England,
where no code has been drawn up on general principles, the
class of injuries that are treated penally is gradually enlarged
as public alarm happens to be excited in particular directions,
but it is largely a matter of accident how the classification of
crimes on one side and civil injuries on the other happens to
stand at any particular time.'
204. . According -to the view here taken, then, there is no
direct reference in punishment by the state, either retrospective
'See Markby, Elements of Law, chap. xi, especially note I, p. 243; and
Austin, Lecture XXVII. Between crimes and civil injuries the distinction,
as it actually exists, is merely one of procedure (as stated by Austin, p. 518).
The violation of right in one case is proceeded against by the method of indictment, in the other by an "action.! The distinction that in one case pun-

ishment is the object of the process, in the other redress, is introduced in
order to explain the difference of procedure; and to justify this distinction
resort is had to the further distinction, that civil injury is considered to
affect the individual merely, crime to affect the state. But in fact the" action for civil injury may incidentally have a penal result (Atistin, p. 521), and
if it had not, many violations of right now treated as civil injuries would
have to -be treated as crimes. As an explanation therefore of the distinction
between crimes and injuries as it stands, it is not correct to say that for the
former punishment is sought, for the latter merely redress. Nor for reasons already given is it true of any civil injury to say that it affects, or should
be considered as affecting, injured. individuals ierely. The only distinction
of principle is that between violations of right which call for punishment and
those which -do not; and those only do not call for punishment in some
form or other which arise either from uncertainty as to the right violated,
or from inability to prevent the violation.
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or prospective, to moral good or evil. The state in its judicial
action does not look to the moral guilt of the criminal whom it
punishes, or to the promotion of moral good by means of his
punishment in him or others. It looks not to virtue and vice.
but to rights and wrongs. It looks back to the wrong done
in the crime which it punishes; not, however, in order to avenge
it, but in order to the consideration of the sort of terror which
needs to be associated with such wrongdoing in order to the
future maintenance of rights. If the character of the criminal
comes into account at all, it can only be properly as an incident
of this consideration. Thus punishment of crime is preventive
in its object; not, however, preventive of any or every evil and
by any and every means, but (according to its idea or as it
should be) justly preventive of injustice; preventive of interference with those powers of action and acquisition which it is
for the general well-being that individuals should possess, and
according to laws .which allow those powers equally to all men.
But in order effectually to attain its preventive object and to
attain it justly, it should be reformatory.
When the reformatory office of punishment is insisted on, the reference may
be, and from the judicial point of view must be, not to the
moral good of the criminal as an ultimate end, but to his recovery from criminal habits as a means to that which is the
proper and direct object of state punishment, viz., the general
protection of rights. The reformatory function of punishment
is from this point of view an incident of its preventive function,
as regulated by the consideration of what is just to the criminal
as well as to others. For the fulfilment of this latter function,
the great thing, as we have seen, is by the punishment of an
actual criminal to deter other possible criminals; but for the
same purpose, unless the actual criminal is to be put out of
the way or locked up for life, it must be desirable to reform
him so that he may not be dangerous in future. Now when
it is asked why he should not be put out of the way, it must
not be forgotten that among the rights which the state has to
maintain are included rights of the criminal himself.
These
indeed are for the time suspended by his action in violation of
rights, but founded as they are on the capacity for contributing to social good, they could only be held to be finally forfeited
on the ground that this capacity was absolutely extinct.
205. This consideration limits the kind of punishment
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which the state may justly inflict. It ought not in punishhig
to sacrifice unnecessarily to the maintenance of rights in general
what might be called the reversionary rights of the criminal,
rights which, if properly treated, he might ultimately become
capable of exercising for the general good. Punishment therefore either by death of by perpetual imprisonment is justifiable
only on one of two grounds; either that association of the extremest terror with certain actions is under certain conditions
necessary to preserve the possibility of a social life based on
the observance of rights, or that the crime punished affords" a
presumption of a permanent incapacity for rights on the part
of the criminal. The first justification may be pleaded for the
executions of men concerned in treasonable outbreaks, or guilty
of certain breaches of discipline in war (on the supposition that
the war is necessary for the safety of the state and that such
punishments are a necessary incident of war).
Whether the
capital punishment is really just in such cases must depend, not
only on its necessity as an incident in the defense of a certain
state, but on the question whether that state itself is fulfilling
its function as a sustainer of true rights. For the penalty of
death for murder both justifications may be urged. It cannot
be defended on any other ground, but it may be doubted whether
the presumption of permanent incapacity for rights is onq
which in our ignorance we can ever be entitled to make. As to
the other plea, the question is whether, with, a proper police
system and sufficient certainty of detection and conviction, the
association of this extremest terror with the murderer is necessary to the security of life. Where the death penalty, however,
is unjustifiable, so must be that of really permanent imprisonment; one as much a's the other is an absolute deprivation of
free social life, and of the possibilities of moral development
Which that life affords. The only justification for a sentence of
permanent imprisonment in a case where there would be none
for capital punishment would be that, though inflicted as permanent, the imprisonment might be brought to an end in the event
of any su~ciien.t proof appearing of the criminal's amendment.
But such proof could only .be afforded if the imprisonment
where. so modified as to allow the prisoner a certain amount of
liberty.
206. If punishment then is to be just, in the sense that
in its infliction due account is taken. of all rights, including
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the suspended rights of the criminal himself, it must be, so far
as public safety allows, reformatory. It must tend to qualify
the criminal for the resumption of rights. As reformatory,
however, punishment has for its direct object the qualification
for the exercise of rights, and is only concerned with the moralization of the criminal indirectly so far as it may result from
the exercise of rights. But even where it cannot be reformatory
in this sense, and over and above its reformatory function in
cases where it has one, it has a moral end. Just because punishment by the state has for its direct object the maintenance of,
rights, it has, like every other function of the state, indirectly
a moral object, because true rights, according to our definition,
are powers which it is for the general well-being that the individual (or association) should possess, and that well-being is
essentially a moral well-being. Ultimately, therefore, the just
punishment of crime is for the moral good of the community.
It is also for the moral good of the criminal himself, unlessand this is a supposition which we ought not to make-he is
beyond the reach of moral influences. Though not inflicted for
that purpose, and though it would not the less have to be inflicted
if no moral effect on the criminal could be discerned, it is
morally the best thing that can happen to him. It is so, even
if a true social necessity requires that he be punished with
death. The fact that society is obliged so to deal with him
affords the best chance 'of bringing home to him the anti-social
nature of his act. It is true that the last utterances of murderers generally convey the impression that they consider themselves interesting persons, quite sure of going to heaven; but
these are pr6bably conventional. At any rate, if the solemn
infliction of punishment on behalf of human society, and without
any sign of vindictiveness, will not breed the shame which is the
moral new birth, presumably nothing else within human reach
will.
"
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